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Abstract
A new logic for verification of security policies is proposed. The
logic, HyperLTL, extends linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with con-
nectives for explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple exe-
cution paths, thereby enabling HyperLTL to express information-flow
security policies that LTL cannot. A model-checking algorithm for a
fragment of HyperLTL is given, and the algorithm is implemented in a
prototype model checker. The class of security policies expressible in
HyperLTL is characterized by an arithmetic hierarchy of hyperproper-
ties.
1 Introduction
The theory of trace properties, which characterizes correct behavior of pro-
grams in terms of properties of individual execution paths, developed out
of an interest in proving the correctness of programs [27]. Practical model-
checking tools [10, 22, 23, 28] now enable automated verification of correct-
ness. Verification of security, unfortunately, isn’t directly possible with such
tools, because some important security policies require sets of execution
paths to model [34]. But there is reason to believe that similar verification
methodologies could be developed for security:
• The self-composition construction [7, 41] reduces properties of pairs
of execution paths to properties of single execution paths, thereby
enabling verification of a class of security policies.
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• The theory of hyperproperties [12] generalizes the theory of trace prop-
erties to security policies, showing that certain classes of security poli-
cies are amenable to verification with invariance arguments [2] and
with stepwise refinement [47].
Prompted by these ideas, this paper develops an automated verification
methodology for security. In our methodology, security policies are expressed
as logical formulas, and a model checker verifies those formulas.
We propose a new logic named HyperLTL, which generalizes linear-time
temporal logic (LTL) [38]. LTL implicitly quantifies over only a single ex-
ecution path of a system, but HyperLTL allows explicit quantification over
multiple execution paths simultaneously, as well as propositions that stipu-
late relationships among those paths. For example, HyperLTL can express
information-flow policies such as “for all execution paths π1, there exists
an execution path π2, such that π1 and π2 always appear equivalent to ob-
servers who are not cleared to view secret information.” Neither LTL nor
branching-time logics (e.g., CTL [15] and CTL∗ [16]) can directly express
such policies, because they lack the capability to correlate multiple execu-
tion paths [3, 34]. Providing that capability is the key idea of HyperLTL.
The syntax that enables it is described in §2, along with several examples of
information-flow policies. The semantics of HyperLTL is given in §3. It is
based on a standard LTL semantics [38] that models a formula with a single
computation, which is a propositional abstraction of an execution path. Our
HyperLTL semantics models a formula with a sequence of computations,
making it possible to correlate multiple execution paths.
We also define a new model-checking algorithm for HyperLTL. Our al-
gorithm uses a well-known LTL model-checking algorithm [46,48] based on
Bu¨chi automata: As input, that algorithm takes a formula φ to be verified
and a system S modeled as a Bu¨chi automaton AS . The algorithm mechan-
ically translates the formula to another Bu¨chi automaton Aφ, then applies
automata-theoretic constructions to AS and Aφ. The output is either “yes,”
the system satisfies the formula, or “no,” along with a counterexample path
demonstrating that φ does not hold of S. In §4, we upgrade that algo-
rithm with a self-composition construction, so that it can verify formulas
over multiple paths. We obtain a model-checking algorithm that handles
an important fragment of HyperLTL, including all of the examples in §2.1.
We implemented that algorithm in a prototype model-checker, which §4
describes.
Hyperproperties can characterize the security policies expressible in Hy-
perLTL. The quantifiers appearing in a HyperLTL formula give rise to a
2
hierarchy of hyperproperties, which we define in §5. The hierarchy con-
tains 2-safety [41] and k-safety [12] hyperproperties as special cases. And it
yields an arithmetic hierarchy of hyperproperties that elegantly character-
izes which hyperproperties can be verified by our model-checking algorithm.
This paper thus contributes to the theory of computer security by
• defining a new logic for expressing security polices,
• showing that logic is expressive enough to formulate important infor-
mation-flow policies,
• giving an algorithm for model-checking a fragment of the logic,
• prototyping that algorithm and using it to verify security policies, and
• characterizing the mathematical structure of security policies in terms
of an arithmetic hierarchy of hyperproperties.
Though our results build upon the formal methods literature, our interest
and application is entirely within the science of constructing systems that
are provably secure.
We proceed as follows. §2 defines the syntax of HyperLTL and provides
several example formulations of information-flow policies. §3 defines the se-
mantics of HyperLTL. §4 defines our model-checking algorithm. §5 discusses
hyperproperties and HyperLTL. §6 reviews related work.
2 Syntax
HyperLTL extends propositional linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [38] with
explicit quantification over paths, which are infinite sequences of execution
states. Formulas of HyperLTL are formed according to the following syntax:
φ ::= Aφ | Eφ | ψ
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | 〈ψ, . . . , ψ〉 | Xψ | ψ U ψ
A HyperLTL formula φ starts with a sequence of path quantifiers. A
and E are universal and existential path quantifiers, respectively, read as
“along all paths” and “along some path.” For example, AAEψ means that
for all paths π1 and π2, there exists another path π3, such that ψ holds
on those three paths. (Since branching-time logics also have explicit path
quantifiers, it is natural to wonder why we don’t use one of them. We
postpone addressing that question until §2.2.) An atomic proposition p
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expresses some fact about states. The focus connective, written 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉,
is used to restrict attention to individual paths: ψ1 must hold of the first
path quantified over, ψ2 of the second, and so forth. Boolean connectives
¬ and ∨ have the usual classical meanings. Implication, conjunction, and
bi-implication are defined as syntactic sugar: ψ1 → ψ2 = ¬ψ1 ∨ ψ2, and
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 = ¬(¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2), and ψ1 ↔ ψ2 = ψ1 → ψ2 ∧ ψ2 → ψ1. True and
false, written ⊤ and ⊥, are defined as p ∨ ¬p and ¬⊤, respectively.
Temporal connective X is read as “next.” Formula Xψ means that ψ
holds on the next state of every quantified path. Likewise, U is read “until,”
and ψ1 U ψ2 means that ψ2 will eventually hold of all quantified paths, and
until then ψ1 holds. The other standard temporal connectives F, G and R,
read as “future,” “globally,” and “release,” are defined as syntactic sugar:
Fψ = ⊤Uψ, meaning in the future, ψ must eventually hold; Gψ = ¬F¬ψ,
meaning ψ must hold, globally; and ψ1 R ψ2 = ¬(¬ψ1 U ¬ψ2), meaning ψ2
must hold until released by ψ1.
A HyperLTL formula φ is well-formed iff (i) φ contains at least one path
quantifier, and (ii) the length n of all focus subformulas 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 equals
the number of path quantifiers at the beginning of φ.
2.1 Security policies in HyperLTL
We now put HyperLTL into action by formulating several security policies.
Access control. An access control policy permits an operation op on
an object o to proceed only if the subject s requesting op has the right
to perform op on o. Let permit
op,o be a proposition denoting that op is
permitted on o, and reqs,op,o that s has requested to perform op on o, and
hasRights,op,o that s has the right to perform op on o. Access control can be
expressed in HyperLTL as follows:
AG(reqs,op,o → (hasRights,op,o ↔ permitop,o)). (1)
Guaranteed service. If a system always eventually responds to a request
for service, then it provides guaranteed service:
AG(req→ F resp). (2)
Both access control (1) and guaranteed service (2) are examples of trace
properties expressible in LTL. Any LTL property can be expressed in Hy-
perLTL simply by prepending a universal path quantifier to its LTL formula.
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Nonin(ter)ference. A system satisfies noninterference [20] when the out-
puts observed by low-security users are the same as they would be in the
absence of inputs submitted by high-security users. Noninterference thus re-
quires a system to be closed under purging of high-security inputs. The orig-
inal formulation [20] of noninterference uses an event-based system model,
in which an execution path is a sequence of individual events (e.g., com-
mands), and purging removes high-security events from the sequence. An
alternative formulation [33] called noninference uses a state-based system
model, in which an execution path is a sequences of states (e.g., values of
variables), and purging assigns an “empty” value, denoted λ, to the high-
security component of the state. Noninterference and noninference are both
intended to be used with deterministic systems.
Here, we pursue the state-based model, because it blends well with tem-
poral logic, which is also based on states. We note that for any event-based
system, there is a state-based system equivalent to it [35], though an infinite
number of states might be required.
Inputs, outputs, and users are classified into security levels in the follow-
ing examples. For simplicity, we consider only two levels, high and low. We
assume that each state contains input and output variables of each security
level.
Let high hold in a state when its high inputs and outputs are not λ,
and let low-equiv hold on a pair of states whenever those states have the
same low inputs and outputs. Using those propositions, noninference can
be expressed as follows:
AEG(〈⊤,¬high〉 ∧ low-equiv). (3)
The formula starts with AE, which means “for all paths, there exists another
path.” Low equivalence of those paths is formulated as G low-equiv, which
means that at each time step, the current states in the two paths are low
equivalent. Subformula 〈⊤,¬high〉 requires all states of the second path to
have empty high inputs and outputs. The second path is therefore the first
path, but with its high inputs and outputs purged.
Nondeterminism and noninterference. Goguen and Meseguer’s defi-
nition of noninterference [20] requires systems to be deterministic. Nonde-
terminism is useful for specification of systems, however, so many variants
of noninterference have been developed for nondeterministic systems.
A (nondeterministic) system satisfies observational determinism [49] if
every pair of executions with the same initial low observation remain indis-
tinguishable by low users. That is, the system appears to be deterministic
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to low users. Systems that satisfy observational determinism are immune
to refinement attacks [49], because observational determinism is preserved
under refinement. Observational determinism can be expressed as follows:
AA low-equiv → G low-equiv. (4)
There are many definitions of noninterference that do permit low-observ-
able nondeterminism. Generalized noninterference (GNI) [31], for example,
stipulates that the low-security outputs may not be altered by the injection
of high-security inputs. Like noninterference, GNI was original formulated
for event-based systems, but it can also be formulated for state-based sys-
tems [33]. GNI can be expressed as follows:
AAEG(high-in-equiv1,3 ∧ low-equiv2,3). (5)
Proposition high-in-equiv1,3 holds when the current states of the first and
third paths have the same high inputs, and low-equiv2,3 holds when the
current states in the second and third paths are low equivalent. The third
path is therefore an interleaving of the high inputs of the first path and the
low inputs and outputs of the second path. Other security policies based on
interleavings, such as restrictiveness [32] and separability [33], can similarly
be expressed in HyperLTL.
2.2 Comparison with other temporal logics
Why did we invent a new temporal logic instead of using an existing, well-
studied logic? In short, because we don’t know of an existing temporal logic
that can directly express all the policies in §2.1:
• Linear time. LTL formulas express properties of individual execution
paths. But all of the noninterference properties of §2.1 are properties
of sets of execution paths [12,33], hence cannot be formulated in LTL.
Explicit path quantification does enable their formulation in Hyper-
LTL.
• Branching time. CTL [15] and CTL∗ [16] have explicit path quan-
tifiers. But their quantifiers don’t enable expression of relationships
between paths, because only one path is “in scope” at a given place
in a formula. (See appendix A for an example.) So they can’t directly
express policies such as observational determinism (4) and GNI (5).
HyperLTL does allow many paths to be in scope, as well as proposi-
tions over all those paths.
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By using the self-composition construction, it is possible to express
relational noninterference in CTL [7] and observational determinism
in CTL∗ [24]. Those approaches resemble HyperLTL, but HyperLTL
formulas express policies directly over the original system, rather than
over a self-composed system.
Furthermore, the self-composition approach does not seem capable of
expressing policies, such as noninference (3) and generalized noninter-
ference (5), that have both universal and existential path quantifiers
over infinite paths. (A recent upgrade of self-composition, asymmetric
product programs [6], does enable verification of refinement proper-
ties involving both kinds of quantifiers. It might be possible to ex-
press policies like noninference with that upgrade.) Nonetheless, it is
straightforward to express such policies in HyperLTL.
• Modal µ-calculus. Modal µ-calculus [26] generalizes CTL∗. But as
expressive as modal µ-calculus is, it remains insufficient [3] to express
all opacity policies [8], which prohibit observers from discerning the
truth of a predicate. (Alur et al. [3] actually write “secrecy” rather
than “opacity.”) Simplifying definitions slightly, a trace property P is
opaque iff for all paths π of a system, there exists another path π′ of
that system, such that π and π′ are low-equivalent, and exactly one of
π and π′ satisfies P . HyperLTL is able to express all opacity policies
over linear-time properties: given LTL formula φP that expresses a
linear-time trace property P , HyperLTL formula
AE((G low-equiv) ∧ (〈φP ,¬φP 〉 ∨ 〈¬φP , φP 〉))
stipulates that P is opaque. Noninference (3), for example, is a linear-
time opacity policy [40].
3 Semantics
HyperLTL formulas are interpreted with respect to computations. A com-
putation abstracts away from the states in a path, representing each state
by the propositions that hold of that state. Let Atoms denote the set of
atomic propositions. Formally, a computation γ is an infinite sequence over
P(Atoms), where P denotes the powerset operator. Define γ[i] to be element
i of computation γ. Hence, γ[i] is a set of propositions. And define γ[i..] to
be the suffix of γ starting with element i—that is, the sequence γ[i]γ[i+1] . . .
We index sequences starting at 1, so γ[1..] = γ.
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A computation represents a single path, but HyperLTL formulas may
quantify over multiple paths. To represent that, let Γ denote a finite tuple
(γ1, . . . , γk) of computations. Define |Γ| to be the length k of Γ, and define
projection prj i(Γ) to be element γi. Given a tuple Γ define Γ·γ to be the con-
catenation of element γ to the end of tuple Γ, yielding tuple (γ1, . . . , γk, γ).
Extend that notation to concatenation of tuples by defining Γ · Γ′ to be the
tuple containing all the elements of Γ followed by all the elements of Γ′.
Extend notations γ[i] and γ[i..] to apply to computation tuples by defining
Γ[i] = (γ1[i], . . . , γk[i])—that is, the tuple containing element i from each
computation in Γ—and Γ[i..] = (γ1[i..], . . . , γk[i..]).
HyperLTL formulas may involve propositions over multiple states. For
example, low-equiv in the definition of noninference (3) holds when two states
have the same low inputs and outputs. We therefore need a means to de-
termine what compound propositions hold of a tuple of states, given what
atomic propositions hold of the individual states. To do that, we introduce
bonding functions that describe how to produce compound propositions out
of tuples of atomic propositions. Let Compounds denote the set of compound
propositions, and assume that Atoms ⊆ Compounds. Let B be a family
{Bi | i ∈ N} of functions, such that each Bi is a function from P(Atoms)
i
to P(Compounds). Notation Xn is the n-ary cartesian power of set X.
We require B1 to be the identity function, so that length-1 tuples are not
changed by bonding. As an example, consider a bonding function B2 that
describes when two states are low-equivalent. Given a set {lowi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
of atoms, describing n different low states, we could define B2 such that
B2({lowi}, {lowi}) = {low-equiv}, and B2({lowi}, {lowj}) = ∅ if i 6= j. Given
a tuple, it is always clear from the length of the tuple which function Bi
should be applied to it, so henceforth we omit the subscript.
The validity judgment for HyperLTL formulas is written Γ |= φ. Formula
φ must be well-formed. The judgment implicitly uses a model M , which is a
set of computations, and a family B of bonding functions. We omit notating
M and B as part of the judgment, because they do not vary during the
interpretation of a formula. Validity is defined as follows:
1. Γ |= Aψ iff for all γ ∈M : Γ · γ |= ψ
2. Γ |= Eψ iff there exists γ ∈M : Γ · γ |= ψ
3. Γ |= p iff p ∈ B(Γ[1])
4. Γ |= ¬ψ iff Γ 6|= ψ
5. Γ |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff Γ |= ψ1 or Γ |= ψ2
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6. Γ |= 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 iff for all i : if 1 ≤ i ≤ n then prj i(Γ) |= ψi
7. Γ |= Xψ iff Γ[2..] |= ψ
8. Γ |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff there exists k : k ≥ 1 and Γ[k..] |= ψ2 and for all j : if
1 ≤ j < k then Γ[j..] |= ψ1
Clauses 1 and 2 quantify over a computation γ from M , and they concate-
nate γ to Γ to evaluate subformula ψ. Clause 3 means satisfaction of atomic
propositions is determined by the first element of each computation in Γ.
Clauses 4 and 5 are standard. In clause 6, elements of a focus formula are
independently evaluated over their corresponding individual computations.
Clauses 7 and 8 are the standard LTL definitions of X and U, upgraded to
work over a sequence of computations.
4 Model Checking
Model-checking is possible at least for fragments of HyperLTL. For example,
HyperLTL contains LTL as a fragment, and LTL enjoys a decidable model-
checking algorithm. Here’s a much larger fragment of HyperLTL that can
be model checked:
• The series of quantifiers at the beginning of a formula may involve
only a single alternation of quantifiers. For example, Eψ and AAEψ
are allowed, but AEAψ is not.
• In focus formulas 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉, the subformulas ψi may not use tem-
poral connectives X and U. Hence all the ψi must be propositional
formulas.
We name this fragment HyperLTL2, because every formula in it may begin
with at most two kinds of quantifiers—a sequence of A’s followed by a se-
quence of E’s, or vice-versa. HyperLTL2 is an important fragment, because
it is expressive enough for all the security policies formulated in §2.1.
We now give a model-checking algorithm for HyperLTL2. Our algorithm
adapts previously known algorithms for LTL model-checking [18,19,44,45].
Those LTL algorithms determine whether a set M of computations satisfies
an LTL formula φ, as follows:
1. Represent M as a Bu¨chi automaton [9], AM . Its language is M .
2. Construct Bu¨chi automaton A¬φ, whose language is the set of all com-
putations that don’t satisfy φ.
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3. Intersect AM and A¬φ, yielding automaton AM ∩ A¬φ. Its language
contains all computations of M that don’t satisfy φ.
4. Check whether the language of AM ∩ A¬φ is empty. If so, all compu-
tations of M satisfy φ, hence M satisfies φ. If not, then any element
of the language is a counterexample showing thatM doesn’t satisfy φ.
Our algorithm for model-checking HyperLTL2 adapts that LTL algo-
rithm. Without loss of generality, assume that the HyperLTL2 formula to be
verified has the form Ak Ej ψ, where Ak and Ej denote sequences of univer-
sal and existential path quantifiers of lengths k and j. (Formulas of the form
Ek Aj ψ can be verified by rewriting them as Ak Ej ¬ψ.) Let n equal k+j. Se-
mantically, a model of ψ must be an n-tuple of computations. Let zip denote
the usual function that maps an n-tuple of sequences to a single sequence
of n-tuples—for example, zip([1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6]) = [(1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 6)]—and
let unzip denote its inverse. To determine whether a system M satisfies
HyperLTL2 formula A
k Ej ψ, our algorithm follows the same basic steps as
the LTL algorithm:
1. Represent M as a Bu¨chi automaton, AM . Construct the n-fold prod-
uct of AM with itself—that is, AM × AM × · · · × AM , where “AM”
occurs n times. This construction is straightforward and formalized in
appendix B. Denote the resulting automaton as AnM . If γ1, . . . γn are
all computations of M , then zip(γ1, . . . γn) is a word in the language
of AnM .
2. Construct Bu¨chi automaton Aψ. Its language is the set of all words w
such that unzip(w) = Γ and Γ |= ψ—that is, the tuples Γ of computa-
tions that satisfy ψ. This construction, formalized in appendix B, is a
generalization of the corresponding LTL construction.
3. Intersect AnM and Aψ, yielding automaton A
n
M ∩Aψ. Its language
is essentially the tuples of computations of M that satisfy ψ. This
construction is standard [11].
4. Check whether L(((AnM ∩Aψ)|k)
C ∩AkM ) is empty, where (i) A
C de-
notes the complement of an automaton A, (complement constructions
are well-known—e.g., [44]—so we do not formalize one here), and (ii)
A|k denotes the same automaton as A, but with every transition label
(which is an n-tuple of propositions) projected to only its first k ele-
ments. That is, if L(A) contains words of the form zip(γ1, . . . γn), then
L(A|k) contains words of the form zip(γ1, . . . γk). Projection erases the
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final j computations from each letter of a word, leaving only the ini-
tial k computations. Thus a word is in the projected language iff there
exists some extension of the word in the original language.
If L(((AnM ∩Aψ)|k)
C ∩AkM ) is empty, thenM satisfies A
k Ej ψ. If not,
then any element of the language is a counterexample showing thatM
doesn’t satisfy Ak Ej ψ.
The final step of the above algorithm is a significant departure from
the LTL algorithm. Intuitively, it works because projection introduces an
existential quantifier, thus enabling verification of formulas with a quantifier
alternation. The following theorem states the correctness of our algorithm:
Theorem 4.1. Let φ be HyperLTL2 formula A
k Ej ψ, and let n = k+j. Let
M be a set of computations. Then φ holds ofM iff L(((AnM ∩Aψ)|k)
C ∩AkM )
is empty.
Proof. (⇒, by contrapositive) We seek a countermodel showing that Ak Ej ψ
doesn’t hold of M . For that countermodel to exist,
there must exist a k-tuple Γk :
for all j-tuples Γj : if set(Γk · Γj) ⊆M then Γk · Γj |= ¬ψ,
(6)
where set(Γ) denotes the set containing the same elements as tuple Γ. To
find that countermodel Γk, consider L(A
n
M ∩Aψ). If that language is empty,
then
for all k-tuples Γk and
for all j-tuples Γj : if set(Γk · Γj) ⊆M then Γk · Γj |= ¬ψ.
(7)
That’s almost what we want, except that Γk is universally quantified in (7)
rather than existentially quantified as in (6). So we introduce projection and
complementation to relax the universal quantification to existential. First,
note that language L((AnM∩Aψ)|k) contains all zip(Γk) for which there exists
a Γj such that set(Γk ·Γj) ⊆M and Γk ·Γj |= ψ. So if there exists a Γ
∗
k such
that zip(Γ∗k) 6∈ L((A
n
M ∩ Aψ)|k), then for all Γj, if set(Γk · Γj) ⊆ M then
Γk ·Γj |= ¬ψ. That Γ
∗
k would be exactly the countermodel we seek according
to (6). To find such a Γ∗k, it suffices to determine whether L((A
n
M ∩Aψ)|k) ⊂
L(AkM ), because any element that strictly separates those sets would satisfy
the requirements to be a Γ∗k. By simple set theory, X ⊂ Y iff X
C ∩ Y
is not empty. Therefore, if L(((AnM ∩Aψ)|k)
C ∩AkM ) is not empty, then a
countermodel Γ∗k exists.
(⇐) The same argument suffices: if L(((AnM ∩Aψ)|k)
C ∩AkM ) is empty,
then no countermodel can exist.
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We are currently investigating the complexity of this model-checking
algorithm.
Formulas without quantifier alternation. Define HyperLTL1 to be
the fragment of HyperLTL2 that contains formulas with no alternation of
quantifiers. HyperLTL1 can be verified more efficiently than HyperLTL2.
Suppose φ is HyperLTL1 formula A
n ψ. Then it suffices to check whether
AnM∩A¬ψ is non-empty. This is essentially the self-composition construction,
as used in previous work [7, 12,41].
Prototype. We implemented a prototype for the model-checking algo-
rithm in OCaml. The prototype accepts an input file for the state transition
system description, and a HyperLTL2 formula. For the prototype, the de-
scription language of the state transition system requires explicit definition
of the states, single-state and multistate labels. For automata complemen-
tation, the prototype uses GOAL [42], an interactive tool for manipulating
Bu¨chi automata. In the case that a HyperLTL2 property doesn’t hold, a
witness will be produced.
5 Hyperproperties
The mathematical structure of the class of security policies expressible in
HyperLTL can be precisely characterized by hyperproperties. We begin by
summarizing the theory of hyperproperties.
Definition 5.1 (Hyperproperties [12]). A trace is a finite or infinite se-
quence of states. (The terms “infinite trace” and “path” are therefore syn-
onymous.) Define Ψfin to be the set of finite traces and Ψinf to be the set of
infinite traces. A trace property is a set of infinite traces. A set T of traces
satisfies a trace property P iff T ⊆ P . A hyperproperty is a set of sets of
infinite traces, or equivalently a set of trace properties. The interpretation
of a hyperproperty as a security policy is that the hyperproperty is the set
of systems allowed by that policy. Each trace property in a hyperproperty is
an allowed system, specifying exactly which executions must be possible for
that system. Thus a set T of traces satisfies hyperproperty H iff T is in H.
Given a trace property P , the powerset of P is the unique hyperproperty that
expresses the same policy as P . Denote that hyperproperty as [P ].
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5.1 k-hyperproperties
A system satisfies a trace property if every trace of the system satisfies the
property. To determine whether a trace satisfies the property, the trace can
be considered in isolation, without regard for any other traces that might or
might not belong to the system. Similarly, a system satisfies observational
determinism if every pair of its traces—where every pair can be considered
in isolation—satisfies HyperLTL formula (4). These examples suggest a
new class of hyperproperties based on the idea of satisfaction determined by
bounded sets of traces.
Let a k-hyperproperty be a hyperproperty that is definable by a k-ary
relation on traces as follows. Intuitively, one needs to consider at most k
traces at a time to decide whether a system satisfies a k-hyperproperty.
Formally, a hyperproperty H is a k-hyperproperty iff
(∃R ⊆ Ψkinf : (∀S ∈ H :
(∀~t ∈ Ψkinf : set(~t ) ⊆ S =⇒ ~t ∈ R))),
where Ψk
inf
denotes the k-fold Cartesian product of Ψinf (i.e., the set of all k-
tuples of infinite traces), ~t denotes a k-tuple (t1, . . . , tk) of traces, and set(~t )
denotes {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. For a system S to be a member of H , all k-tuples
of traces from S must satisfy R, in which case relation R defines H .
Trace properties are 1-hyperproperties: to decide whether a system S
satisfies a 1-hyperproperty, it suffices to consider each trace of S in isolation.
For a trace property P , the relation that defines hyperproperty [P ] is P itself,
because
(∀S ∈ [P ] : (∀~t ∈ Ψ1inf : set(~t ) ⊆ S =⇒ ~t ∈ P )).
The k-hyperproperties form a hierarchy in which each level requires
consideration of one more trace than the previous level. Formally, any
k-hyperproperty defined by R is also a (k + 1)-hyperproperty defined by
relation {~t · u | ~t ∈ R ∧ u ∈ Ψinf}, where · denotes appending an element
to a tuple—that is, (t1, . . . , tk) · u = (t1, . . . , tk, u). So all 1-hyperproperties
are also 2-hyperproperties, etc.
Observational determinism is a 2-hyperproperty, because it suffices to
consider pairs of traces to decide whether a system satisfies it. The Hyper-
LTL formula (4) that characterizes it makes this apparent:
• The two quantifiers at the beginning of the formula, AA, show that
the policy is defined in terms of pairs of traces.
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• The subformula following the quantifiers, low-equiv ⇒ G low-equiv
gives the relation that defines the policy as a 2-hyperproperty. That
relation is the set of all pairs (t1, t2) of traces such that
comp(t1), comp(t2) |= low-equiv⇒ G low-equiv.
Noninference, however, is not a 2-hyperproperty. Though it can be de-
fined as a relation on pairs of traces, one of those traces is existentially
quantified; k-hyperproperties allow only universal quantification. That sug-
gests the following generalization of k-hyperproperties.
5.2 Q-hyperproperties
Let Q be a finite sequence of universal and existential quantifiers—for ex-
ample, ∀∃. Define hyperproperty H to be an Q-hyperproperty iff |Q| = k
and
(∃R ⊆ Ψkinf : (∀S ∈ H : (Q~t ∈ Ψ
k
inf : ~t ⊆ S : ~t ∈ R))).
Notation Q~t ∈ Ψk
inf
is an abbreviation for k nested quantifications:
Q1 t1 ∈ Ψinf : Q2 t2 ∈ Ψinf : . . . : Qk tk ∈ Ψinf ,
where Qi denotes quantifier i from sequence Q. For example, ∀∃~t ∈ Ψ
k
inf
abbreviates ∀ t1 ∈ Ψinf : ∃ t2 ∈ Ψinf .
Noninference is a ∀∃-hyperproperty. The HyperLTL formula (3) that
characterizes it makes this apparent. The two quantifiers show that the
policy is defined in terms of pairs of traces. Its defining relation is the set
of all pairs (t1, t2) of traces such that
comp(t1), comp(t2) |= G(〈⊤,¬high-in〉 ∧ low-equiv).
Likewise, separability and generalized noninterference are both ∀∀∃-hyper-
properties, and restrictiveness is the intersection of two ∀∀∃-hyperproperties.
The Q-hyperproperties strictly generalize the k-hyperproperties, because
(i) for all k, a k-hyperproperty is a ∀k-hyperproperty, where ∀k denotes a
sequence of k universal quantifiers, and because (ii) no Q-hyperproperty,
such that Q contains ∃, is a k-hyperproperty. As do the k-hyperproperties,
the Q-hyperproperties form a hierarchy: any Q-hyperproperty is also a Q′-
hyperproperty if sequence Q is a prefix of sequence Q′.
A Q-hyperproperty is linear-time if its defining relation R is linear-time,
meaning that it can be expressed with the linear-time temporal connectives,
X and U. (Or, equivalently [17], that it can be expressed in S1S, the monadic
second-order theory of one successor.)
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Proposition 5.2. H is a linear-time Q-hyperproperty iff there exists a Hy-
perLTL formula φ, such that S ∈ H iff S |= φ.
Proof. The relation R that defines H is equivalent to formula φ.
HyperLTL therefore expresses exactly the linear-time Q-hyperproperties,
just as LTL expresses exactly the linear-time trace properties, which are
themselves ∀-hyperproperties.
5.3 Safety
Safety [1] proscribes “bad things.” A bad thing is finitely observable, mean-
ing its occurrence can be detected in finite time, and irremediable, so its
occurrence can never be remediated by future events.
Definition 5.3 (Hypersafety [12]). A hyperproperty S is a safety hyper-
property (is hypersafety) iff
(∀T ⊆ Ψinf : T /∈ S =⇒ (∃B ⊆ Ψfin : |B| ∈ N ∧ B ≤ T
∧ (∀U ⊆ Ψinf : B ≤ U =⇒ U /∈ S))).
For a system T that doesn’t satisfy a safety hyperproperty, the bad thing
is a finite set B of finite traces. B cannot be a prefix of any system U
satisfying the hyper safety property. A finite trace t is a prefix of a (finite
or infinite) trace t′, denoted t ≤ t′, iff t′ = tt′′ for some t′′ ∈ Ψ. And a
finite set T of finite traces is a prefix of a (finite or infinite) set T ′ of (finite
or infinite) traces, denoted T ≤ T ′, iff (∀ t ∈ T : (∃ t′ ∈ T ′ : t ≤ t′)). A
k-safety hyperproperty is a safety hyperproperty in which the bad thing never
involves more than k traces. A hyperproperty S is a k-safety hyperproperty
(is k-hypersafety) [12] iff
(∀T ⊆ Ψinf : T /∈ S =⇒ (∃B ⊆ Ψfin : |B| ≤ k ∧ B ≤ T
∧ (∀U ⊆ Ψinf : B ≤ U =⇒ U /∈ S))).
This is just the definition of hypersafety but with the cardinality of B bounded
by k.
Define a relation R to be a k-safety relation iff
(∀~t ∈ Ψk
inf
: ~t 6∈ R =⇒ (∃~b ∈ Ψ≤k
fin
: ~b ≤ ~t ∧
(∀ ~u ∈ Ψk
inf
: ~b ≤ ~u =⇒ ~u 6∈ R))).
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Prefix on tuples of traces is the pointwise application of prefix on traces:
~t ≤ ~u iff, for all i, it holds that ti ≤ ui. Set Ψ
≤k
fin
is all n-tuples of traces
where n ≤ k.
Observational determinism is a 2-safety hyperproperty [12], as well as
a 2-hyperproperty definable by a 2-safety relation. Moreover, the k-safety
hyperproperties are all k-hyperproperties:
Proposition 5.4. A k-hyperproperty H is definable by a k-safety relation
iff H is a k-safety hyperproperty.
Proof. (⇒) The bad thing for a system that doesn’t satisfy H is tuple ~b.
(⇐) The relation is the set of all k-tuples of traces that do not contain a
bad thing as a prefix.
The k-safety hyperproperties are known [12] to have a relatively complete
verification methodology based on self-composition. Our model-checking
algorithm in §4 increases the class of hyperproperties that can be verified
from k-safety to k-hyperproperties and a fragment of Q-hyperproperties.
5.4 Arithmetic hierarchy
The Q-hyperproperties categorize by quantifier structure. The arithmetic
hierarchy, first studied by Kleene [25], similarly categorizes computable re-
lations. Rogers [39] gives the following characterization of the arithmetic
hierarchy:
Definition 5.5 (Arithmetic hierarchy [39]). An n-ary relation S is in the
arithmetic hierarchy iff S is decidable or there exists a decidable k-ary rela-
tion R such that
S = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | Q1y1Q2y2 . . . Qkyk :
R(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk)},
where, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, quantifier Qi is either ∀ or ∃. The sequence of
quantifiers Qi is the quantifier prefix. When such a prefix does exist for
S, then S is expressible by Qi. The number of alternations in a prefix the
number of pairs of adjacent but unlike quantifiers. For example, in the prefix
∀∀∃∀, there are two alternations. A Σn-prefix, where n > 0, is a prefix that
begins with ∃ and has n − 1 alternations. A Σ0-prefix is a prefix that is
empty. Likewise, a Πn-prefix, where n > 0, is a prefix that begins with ∀
and has n − 1 alternations. A Π0-prefix is a prefix that is empty, so Π0-
prefixes are the same as Σ0-prefixes. The arithmetic hierarchy comprises the
following classes:
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Figure 1: Arithmetic hierarchy of hyperproperties
• Σn is the class of all relations expressible by Σn-prefixes.
• Πn is the class of all relations expressible by Πn-prefixes.
• (Another class, ∆n = Σn ∩Πn, does not concern us here.)
A relation expressible by ∃∀ is, for example, in Σ2, and a relation expressible
by ∀ is in Π1, but a relation expressible by ∀∀ is also in Π1. These classes
form a hierarchy, because they grow strictly larger as n increases: Σn ⊂ Σn+1
and Πn ⊂ Πn+1.
The same idea is applicable to Q-hyperproperties:
• The Σn-hyperproperties are the Q-hyperproperties such that Q is a
Σn-prefix and the defining relation R is decidable.
• The Πn-hyperproperties are the Q-hyperproperties such that Q is a
Πn-prefix and the defining relation R is decidable.
Figure 1 depicts this hierarchy. Simply by reading off the quantifier prefix,
any HyperLTL formula makes it easy to determine (an upper bound on) the
hierarchy level in which it dwells. Observational determinism (whose prefix
is AA) is a Π1-hyperproperty, as are all k-hyperproperties. Noninference
(prefix AE) is a Π2-hyperproperty, as are separability and generalized non-
interference (prefix AAE). Their defining relations are decidable, because
HyperLTL2 validity is decidable.
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This arithmetic hierarchy of hyperproperties yields insight into verifica-
tion. Our model-checking algorithm in §4 permits up to one quantifier alter-
nation, thus verifying a linear-time subclass of Π2-hyperproperties. What
about hyperproperties higher than Π2 in the hierarchy? We don’t yet know
of any security policies that are examples. As Rogers [39] writes, “The hu-
man mind seems limited in its ability to understand and visualize beyond
four or five alternations of quantifier. Indeed, it can be argued that the in-
ventions. . . of mathematics are devices for assisting the mind in dealing with
one or two additional alternations of quantifier.” For practical purposes, we
might not need to go much higher than Π2.
6 Related Work
McLean [33] formalizes security policies as closure with respect to selective
interleaving functions. He shows that trace properties cannot express se-
curity policies such as noninterference and average response time, because
those are not properties of single execution traces. Mantel [30] formalizes
security policies with basic security predicates, which stipulate closure con-
ditions for trace sets.
Clarkson and Schneider [12] introduce hyperproperties, a framework for
expressing security policies. Hyperproperties are sets of trace sets, and
are able to formalize security properties such as noninterference, general-
ized noninterference, observational determinism and average response time.
Clarkson and Schneider use second-order logic to formulate hyperproperties.
That logic isn’t verifiable, in general, because it cannot be effectively and
completely axiomatized. Fragments of it, such as HyperLTL, can be verified.
van der Meyden and Zhang [43] use model-checking to verify noninter-
ference policies. They reduce noninterference properties to safety properties
expressible in standard linear and branching time logics. Their methodol-
ogy requires customized model-checking algorithms for each security policy,
whereas HyperLTL uses the same algorithm for every policy.
Dimitrova et al. [14] propose SecLTL, which extends LTL with a hide
modality H that requires observable behavior to be independent of secret
values. SecLTL is designed for output-deterministic systems. Generalized
noninterference (5), and other policies for nondeterministic systems, do not
seem to be expressible with H.
Balliu et al. [5] use a linear-time temporal epistemic logic to specify
many declassification policies derived from noninterference. Their defini-
tion of noninterference, however, seems to be that of observational deter-
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minism (4). They do not consider any information-flow policies involving
existential quantification, such as noninference (3). They also do not con-
sider systems that accept inputs after execution has begun. Halpern and
O’Neill [21] use a similar temporal epistemic logic to specify secrecy poli-
cies, which subsume many definitions of noninterference; they do not pursue
model checking algorithms.
Milishev and Clarke [36,37] propose a verification methodology based on
formulating hyperproperties as coinductive predicates over trees. They use
the polyadic modal µ-calculus [4] to express hyperproperties and game-based
model-checking to verify them. Their logic, because it includes fixpoint oper-
ators, seems to be more expressive than HyperLTL. Nonetheless, HyperLTL
is able to express many security policies, suggesting that a simpler logic
suffices.
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A The insufficiency of branching-time logic
CTL and CTL∗ have explicit path quantifiers. It’s tempting to try to express
security policies with those quantifiers. Unfortunately, that doesn’t work for
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information-flow policies such as observational determinism (4). Consider
the following fragment of CTL∗ semantics [16]:
s |= Aφ iff for all π ∈M , if π(1) = s then π |= φ
π |= Φ iff π(1) |= Φ
Path formulas φ are modeled by paths π, and state formulas Φ are modeled
by states s. Set M is all paths in the model. State formula Aφ holds at
state s when all paths proceeding from s satisfy φ. Any state formula Φ can
be treated as a path formula, in which case Φ holds of the path iff Φ hold
of the first state on that path. Using this semantics, consider the meaning
of AAφ, which is the form of observational determinism (4):
s |= AAφ
= for all π ∈M if π(1) = s then π |= Aφ
= for all π ∈M and π′ ∈M , if π(1) = π′(1) = s then π′ |= φ
Note how the meaning of AAφ is ultimately determined by the meaning
of φ, where φ is modeled by the single trace π′. Trace π is ignored in
determining the meaning of φ; the second universal path quantifier causes
π to “leave scope.” Hence φ cannot express correlations between π and
π′, as observational determinism requires. So CTL∗ path quantifiers do not
suffice to express information-flow policies. Neither do CTL path quantifiers,
because CTL is a sub-logic of CTL∗. Self-composition does enable expression
of some, though not all, information-flow policies in branching-time logics,
as we discuss in §2.2.
B Model-checking Constructions
B.1 Self-composition construction
Self-composition is the technique that Barthe et al. [7] adopt to verify non-
interference policies. It was generalized by Terauchi and Aiken [41] to verify
observational determinism policies [29, 49], and by Clarkson and Schnei-
der [12] to verify k-safety hyperproperties. We extend this technique to
model-checking of HyperLTL2.
Bu¨chi automata. Bu¨chi automata [46] are finite-state automata that ac-
cept strings of infinite length. A Bu¨chi automaton is a tuple (Σ, S,∆, S0, F )
where Σ is an alphabet, S is the set of states, ∆ is the transition relation
such that ∆ ⊆ S × Σ× S, S0 is the set of initial states, and F is the set of
24
accepting states, where both S0 ⊆ S and F ⊆ S. A string is a sequence of
letters in Σ. A path s0s1 . . . of a Bu¨chi automaton is over a string α1α2 . . .
if, for all i ≥ 0, it holds that (si, αi+1, si+1) ∈ ∆. A string is recognized by a
Bu¨chi automaton if there exists a path π over the string with some accept-
ing states occurring infinitely often, in which case π is an accepting path.
The language L(A) of an automaton A is the set of strings that automaton
accepts. A Bu¨chi automaton can be derived [11] from a Kripke structure,
which is a common mathematical model of interactive, state-based systems.
Self composition. The n-fold self-composition An of Bu¨chi automaton
A is essentially the product of A with itself, n times. This construction is
defined as follows:
Definition B.1. Bu¨chi automaton An is the n-fold self-composition of
Bu¨chi automaton A, where A = (Σ, S,∆, S0, F ), if A
n = (Σn, Sn,∆′, Sn0 , F
n)
and for all s1, s2 ∈ S
n and α ∈ Σn we have (s1, α, s2) ∈ ∆
′ iff for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that (prj i(s), prj i(α), prj i(s
′)) ∈ ∆.
An recognizes zip(γ1, . . . , γn) if A recognizes each of γ1, . . . , γn:
Proposition B.2. L(An) = {zip(γ1, . . . , γn) | γ1, . . . , γn ∈ L(A)}
Proof. By the construction of An.
B.2 Formula-to-automaton construction
Given a HyperLTL2 formula A
k Ej ψ and a set B of bonding functions, we
now show how to construct an automaton that accepts exactly the strings w
for which unzip(w) |= ψ. Our construction extends standard methodologies
for LTL automata construction [18,19,44,45].
1. Negation normal form. We begin by preprocessing ψ to put it in
a form more amenable to model checking. The formula is rewritten to be
in negation normal form (NNF), meaning (i) negation connectives are ap-
plied only to atomic propositions in ψ, (ii) the only connectives used in ψ
are X, U, R, ¬, ∨, ∧, and focus formulas, and (iii) every focus formula con-
tains exactly one non-⊤ subformula—for example, 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤, p,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 or
〈⊤, . . . ,⊤,¬p,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉—and that subformula must be an atomic proposi-
tion or its negation. We identify ¬¬ψ with ψ.
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2. Construction. We now construct a generalized Bu¨chi automaton [13]
Aψ for ψ. A generalized Bu¨chi automaton is the same as a Bu¨chi automaton
except that it has multiple sets of accepting states. That is, a generalized
Bu¨chi automaton is a tuple (Σ, S,∆, S0, F ) where Σ, S, ∆ and S0 are defined
as for Bu¨chi automata, and F = {Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and Fi ⊆ S}. Each of
the Fi is an accepting set. A string is recognized by a generalized Bu¨chi
automaton if there is a path over the string with at least one of the states
in every accepting set occurring infinitely often.
To construct the states of Aψ, we need some additional definitions. De-
fine closure cl(ψ) of ψ to be the least set of subformulas of ψ that is closed
under the following rules:
• if 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤, ψ′,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 ∈ cl(ψ), then 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤,¬ψ′,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 ∈
cl(ψ).
• if ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ) and ψ′ is not in the form of 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉, then ¬ψ
′ ∈ cl(ψ).
• if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ) or ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ cl(ψ).
• if Xψ′ ∈ cl(ψ), then ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ).
• if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ) or ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ cl(ψ).
And define K to be a maximal consistent set with respect to cl(ψ) if K ⊆
cl(ψ) and the following conditions hold:
• if ψ′ is not a focus formula, then (ψ′ ∈ K iff ¬ψ′ 6∈ K).
• if ψ′ is a focus formula 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤, ψ′,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 and ψ′ ∈ cl(ψ), then
(ψ′ ∈ K iff 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤,¬ψ′,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 6∈ K).
• if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ K iff {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ K).
• if ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ cl(ψ), then (ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ K iff ψ1 ∈ K or ψ2 ∈ K).
• if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ K then ψ1 ∈ K or ψ2 ∈ K.
• if ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ K then ψ2 ∈ K.
Define ms(ψ) to be the set of all maximal consistent sets with respect to ψ.
The elements of ms(ψ) will be the states of Aψ; hence each state is a set of
formulas. Intuitively, a state s describes a set of computation tuples where
each tuple is a model of all the formulas in s. There will be a transition
from a state s1 to a state s2 iff every computation tuple described by s2 is
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an immediate suffix of some tuple described by s1. (Tuple Γ is an immediate
suffix of Γ′ iff Γ = Γ′[2..].)
Automaton Aψ = (Σψ, Sψ,∆ψ, {ιψ}, Fψ) is defined as follows:
• The alphabet Σψ is P(Atoms)
n. Each letter of the alphabet is, there-
fore, an n-tuple of sets of atomic propositions.
• The set Sψ of states is ms(ψ) ∪ {ιψ}, where ms(ψ) is defined above
and ιψ is a distinct initial state.
• The transition relation ∆ψ contains (s1, α, s2), where {s1, s2} ⊆ Sψ \
{ιψ} and α ∈ Σψ, iff
– For all p ∈ Atoms, if 〈⊤, . . . ,⊤, p,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 ∈ s2, and p is el-
ement i of that focus formula, then p ∈ prj i(α). Likewise, if
〈⊤, . . . ,⊤,¬p,⊤, . . . ,⊤〉 ∈ s2, then p 6∈ prj i(α).
– For all p ∈ Compounds, if p ∈ s2 then p ∈ B(α). Likewise, if
¬p ∈ s2 then p 6∈ B(α).
– If Xψ′ ∈ s1 then ψ
′ ∈ s2.
– If ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ s1 and ψ2 6∈ s1 then ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ s2.
– If ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ s1 and ¬ψ1 ∈ s1 then ψ1 R ψ2 ∈ s2.
And ∆ψ contains (ιψ, α, s2) iff ψ ∈ s2 and (ιψ, α, s2) is a transition
permitted by the above rules for Atoms and Compounds.
• The set of initial states contains only ιψ.
• The set Fψ of sets of accepting states contains one set {s ∈ (Sψ \
{ιψ}) | ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ s or ψ2 ∈ s} for each until formula ψ1 U ψ2 in
cl(ψ).
The definition of Fψ guarantees that, for every until formula ψ1Uψ2, eventu-
ally ψ2 will hold. That is because the transition rules don’t allow a transition
from a state containing ψ1 U ψ2 to a state containing ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) unless ψ2
is already satisfied.
3. Degeneralization of Bu¨chi automata. Finally, convert generalized
Bu¨chi automaton Aψ to a “plain” Bu¨chi automaton. This conversion is
entirely standard [19], so we do not repeat it here.
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Correctness of the construction. The following proposition states that
Aψ is constructed such that it recognizes computation tuples that model ψ:
Proposition B.3. Γ |= ψ iff zip(Γ) ∈ L(Aψ).
Proof. (⇐) By the construction of Aψ, the states with a transition from
ιψ contain ψ. Hence by Lemma B.4 below, for all the strings w such that
w = zip(Γ) in L(Aψ), it holds that Γ |= ψ.
(⇒) Let si = {ψ
′ ∈ cl(ψ) | Γ[i..] |= ψ′} for all i ∈ N. Then by the
definition, si ∈ ms(ψ). We show that ιψs1s2 . . . is an accepting path in Aψ.
By Γ |= ψ we have ψ ∈ s1. By the construction of Aψ, (iψ, α1, s1) ∈ ∆ψ
where α1 = zip(Γ)[1]. The construction of the path inductively follows the
construction of Aψ, which respects the semantics of HyperLTL.
Lemma B.4. Let ιψs1 . . . be an accepting path in Aψ over the string w =
α1α2 . . . . Let Γ = unzip(w). Then for all i ≥ 0, it holds that ψ
′ ∈ si iff
Γ[i..] |= ψ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ψ′:
Base cases:
1. ψ′ = p where p ∈ Compounds
(⇒) Assume that p ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ, if p ∈ si then p ∈
Bn(αi) or equivalently p ∈ Bn(Γ[i]). By the semantics of HyperLTL,
we have Γ[i..] |= p.
(⇐) Assume that Γ[i..] |= p. Then p ∈ Bn(Γ[i]), which is equivalent to
p ∈ Bn(αi). By the fact that states are maximal consistent sets, one
of p or ¬p must appear in si. By the construction of Aψ and the fact
that p ∈ Bn(αi), we have p ∈ si.
2. ψ′ = 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉
(⇒) Assume that ψ′ ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ, for all 1 ≤ r ≤ n,
if ψr = p we have p ∈ prj r(αi) or equivalently p ∈ prj r(Γ[i]). Then
by the semantics of HyperLTL, prj r(Γ[i]) |= ψr. If ψr = ¬p, then
p 6∈ prj r(Γ[i]), which again concludes prj r(Γ[i]) |= ψr. Therefore we
have Γ[i..] |= ψ′.
(⇐) Assume that Γ[i..] |= ψ′. Then for all 1 ≤ r ≤ n, prj r(Γ[i]) |= ψr.
If ψr = p we have p ∈ prj r(Γ[i]), which is equivalent to p ∈ prj r(αi).
If ψr = ¬p then p 6∈ prj r(Γ[i]), which is p 6∈ prj r(αi). By the fact that
states are maximal consistent sets, one of 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 or a member of
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〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 must appear in si. By the semantics of HyperLTL and
the construction of Aψ, only 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉 can be in si, that means
ψ′ ∈ si.
Inductive cases:
1. ψ′ = ¬ψ′′
(⇒) Assume that ¬ψ′′ ∈ si, Then ψ
′′ 6∈ si. By induction hypothesis,
Γ[i..] 6|= ψ′′, or equivalently, Γ[i..] |= ¬ψ′′. Hence, Γ[i..] |= ψ′.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
2. ψ′ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2
(⇒) By the construction of Aψ, if ψ1∨ψ2 ∈ si then ψ1 ∈ si or ψ2 ∈ si.
By induction hypothesis, Γ[i..] |= ψ1 or Γ[i..] |= ψ2, which concludes
Γ[i..] |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
3. ψ′ = Xψ′′
(⇒) Assume that ψ′ ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ, ψ
′′ ∈ si+1. By
induction hypothesis, Γ[i+ 1..] |= ψ′′, which concludes Γ[i..] |= Xψ′′.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒ and the fact that always one of Xψ′′ or ¬Xψ′′
appears in a state.
4. ψ′ = ψ1 U ψ2
(⇒) Assume that ψ1Uψ2 ∈ si. By the construction of Aψ and the fact
that the path is accepting, there is some j ≥ i such that ψ2 ∈ sj . Let
j be the smallest index. By induction hypothesis, Γ[j..] |= ψ2. By the
construction of Aψ, for all i ≤ k < j, ψ1 ∈ sk. Therefore by induction
hypothesis, Γ[k..] |= ψ1. which concludes Γ[i..] |= ψ1 U ψ2.
(⇐) Similar to ⇒.
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